Overview

Seqrite Labs APT-Team has identified and tracked UNG0002 also known as Unknown Group 0002, a bunch of espionage-oriented operations which has been grouped under the same cluster conducting campaigns across multiple Asian jurisdictions including China, Hong Kong, and Pakistan. This threat entity demonstrates a strong preference for using shortcut files (LNK), VBScript, and post-exploitation tools such as Cobalt Strike and Metasploit, while consistently deploying CV-themed decoy documents to lure victims.

The cluster’s operations span two major campaigns: Operation Cobalt Whisper (May 2024 – September 2024) and Operation AmberMist (January 2025 – May 2025). During Operation Cobalt Whisper, 20 infection chains were observed targeting defense, electrotechnical engineering, and civil aviation sectors. The more recent Operation AmberMist campaign has evolved to target gaming, software development, and academic institutions with improved lightweight implants including Shadow RAT, Blister DLL Implant, and INET RAT.

In the recent operation AmberMist, the threat entity has also abused the ClickFix Technique – a social engineering method that tricks victims into executing malicious PowerShell scripts through fake CAPTCHA verification pages. Additionally, UNG0002 leverages DLL sideloading techniques, particularly abusing legitimate Windows applications like Rasphone and Node-Webkit binaries to execute malicious payloads.

Key Findings

• Multi-Stage Attacks: UNG0002 employs sophisticated infection chains using malicious LNK files, VBScript, batch scripts, and PowerShell to deploy custom RAT implants including Shadow RAT, INET RAT, and Blister DLL.
• ClickFix Social Engineering: The group utilizes fake CAPTCHA verification pages to trick victims into executing malicious PowerShell scripts, notably spoofing Pakistan’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs website.
  
• Abusing DLL Sideloading: In the recent campaign, consistent abuse of legitimate Windows applications (Rasphone, Node-Webkit) for DLL sideloading to execute malicious payloads while evading detection.
• CV-Themed Decoy Documents: Use of realistic resume documents targeting specific industries, including fake profiles of game UI designers and computer science students from prestigious institutions.
• Persistent Infrastructure: Maintained command and control infrastructure with consistent naming patterns and operational security across multiple campaigns spanning over a year.

• Targeted Industry Focus: Systematic targeting of defense, electrotechnical engineering, energy, civil aviation, academia, medical institutions, cybersecurity researchers, gaming, and software development sectors.
• Attribution Challenges: UNG0002 represents an evolving threat cluster that demonstrates high adaptability by mimicking techniques from other threat actor playbooks to complicate attribution efforts, with Seqrite Labs assessing with high confidence that the group originates from South-East Asia and focuses on espionage activities. As more intelligence becomes available, associated campaigns may be expanded or refined in the future.

Summary

UNG0002 represents a sophisticated and persistent threat entity from South Asia that has maintained consistent operations targeting multiple Asian jurisdictions since at least May 2024. The group demonstrates high adaptability and technical proficiency, continuously evolving their toolset while maintaining consistent tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The threat actor’s focus on specific geographic regions (China, Hong Kong, Pakistan) and targeted industries suggests a strategic approach to intelligence gathering AKA classic espionage related activities. Their use of legitimate-looking decoy documents, social engineering techniques, and pseudo-advanced evasion methods indicates a well-resourced and experienced operation.

UNG0002 demonstrates consistent operational patterns across both Operation Cobalt Whisper and Operation AmberMist, maintaining similar infrastructure naming conventions, payload delivery mechanisms, and target selection criteria. The group’s evolution from using primarily Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks to developing custom implants like Shadow RAT, INET RAT, and Blister DLL indicates their persistent nature.

Notable technical artifacts include PDB paths revealing development environments such as C:\Users\The Freelancer\source\repos\JAN25\mustang\x64\Release\mustang.pdb for Shadow RAT and C:\Users\Shockwave\source\repos\memcom\x64\Release\memcom.pdb for INET RAT, indicating potential code names “Mustang” and “ShockWave” which indicate the mimicry of already-existing threat groups. An in-depth technical analysis of the complete infection chains and detailed campaign specifics can be found in our comprehensive whitepaper.

Conclusion

Attributing threat activity to a specific group is always a complex task. It requires detailed analysis across several areas, including targeting patterns, tactics and techniques (TTPs), geographic focus, and any possible slip-ups in operational security. UNG0002 is an evolving cluster that Seqrite Labs is actively monitoring. As more intelligence becomes available, we may expand or refine the associated campaigns. Based on our current findings, we assess with high confidence that this group originates from South-East Asia and demonstrates a high level of adaptability — often mimicking techniques seen in other threat actor playbooks to complicate attribution focusing on espionage. We also, appreciate other researchers in the community, like malwarehunterteam for hunting these campaigns.

IOCs

• Non-PE [Script-Based Files, Shortcut, C2-Config, Encrypted Shellcode blobs]

• PE – Implants

MITRE ATT&CK

Authors

Sathwik Ram Prakki

Subhajeet Singha